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Introduction 
Measurement is the assignment of numerals to a property of a phenomenon – 
‘measurand’ – according to a rule with the aim of generating reliable information 
about this phenomenon. The central measurement problem is the design of rules so 
that the information is a reliable as possible. To arrive at reliable numbers for a 
measurand, the rules have to meet specific requirements. The nature of these 
requirements depends on the nature of the measurand and on the circumstances in 
which the measurements will be made. 
 
The dominant measurement theory of today is the Representational Theory of 
Measurement (RTM) (Krantz e.a. 1971, 1989, 1990).1 The core of this theory is that 
measurement is a process of assigning numbers to attributes or characteristics of the 
empirical world in such a way that the relevant qualitative empirical relations among 
these attributes or characteristics are reflected in the numbers themselves as well as in 
important properties of the number system. 
 
The origins of RTM can be traced in Maxwell’s method of using formal analogies. A 
first glimpse of it appeared in Maxwell’s article ‘On Faraday’s lines of force’ (1965). 
In discussing his method of using analogies, the ‘representational view’ is made en 
passant: “Thus all the mathematical sciences are founded on relations between 
physical laws and laws of numbers, so that the aim of exact science is to reduce the 
problems of nature to the determination of quantities by operations with numbers” (p. 
156). Helmholtz took up Maxwell’s view and continued to think in this direction. 
Usually Helmholtz 1887 is taken as the starting point of the development of the 
representational theory. The development since Helmholtz’s seminal paper is 
described by Michell (1993) and Savage and Ehrlich (1992). 
 
In the formal representational theory, measurement is defined set-theoretically as: 
 
Given a set of empirical relations R = {R1, …, Rn} on a set of extra-
mathematical entities Y and a set of numerical relations P = {P1, …, Pn} on 
the set of numbers N (in general a subset of the set of real numbers), a function 
φ from Y into N takes each Ri into Pi, i = 1, …, n, provided that the elements 
Y1, Y2, … in Y stand in relation Ri if and only if the corresponding numbers 
φ(Y1), φ(Y2), … stand in relation Pi. 
 
In other words, measurement is conceived of as establishing homomorphisms from 
empirical relational structures Ψ = <Y, R> into numerical relational structures Ν = 
<N, P>. We say then that the ordered triple <Ψ, Ν, φ > is a scale. 
 
                                                 
1 See for an early account Suppes and Zinnes 1963. 
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A numerical relational structure representing an empirical relational structure is also 
called a model, therefore the RTM is sometimes called the Model Theory of 
Measurement. 
 
This theory is developed in the context of experimental psychology, and the theory 
accounts properly only for measurements taken in laboratories where the environment 
is always neutralized (so no noise), and where information is not provided by an 
instrument (but often the outcome of e.g. throwing a dice, or turning a card). In 
general, the RTM therefore provides no account for measurement procedures, devices 
and methods, no account for errors and noise, and so fails to cover questions about the 
reliability of measurement outside the laboratory (Boumans 2005). 
 
This paper will show that a modelling strategy that accounts for measurement outside 
the laboratory, where one cannot base measurements on a single simple law, will have 
to drop the requirement that the model is a homomorphic mapping of the empirical 
relational structure. The models used for measurement will be simulacra, that is, 
“having merely the form or appearance of a certain thing, without possessing its 
substance or proper qualities” (OED 1933). This definition is also used by Cartwright 
(1983) to denote what models are, stressing the ‘anti-realist’ aspect of models. She 
could have used the term ‘simulation’, but probably did not because it refers to the 
assumption of false appearances for the sake of deception. But today the term is 
employed without this connotation of deception: “the assumption of the appearance of 
something without having its reality” (Dawson 1962: 1-2). Or to put it briefly: The 
aim of the paper is to show that outside the laboratory, models used for measurement 
aims are simulations. 
 
The reliability of measurement 
To make comparisons between strategies in- and outside the laboratory, the scope of 
the strategies is strongly simplified to a common aim of finding a ‘true’ value of a 
system variable, denoted by x.2 The reliability of a measurement result can be 
characterized by three features: ‘invariance’, ‘accuracy’ and ‘precision’. ‘Invariance’ 
refers to the stability of the relationship between measurand, measuring system and 
environment. ‘Accuracy’ is defined as the closeness of the agreement between the 
result of a measurement and a true value of the measurand, and ‘precision’ is defined 
as the closeness of the agreement between quantity values obtained by replicate 
measurements of a quantity, under specified conditions. 
 
The difference between invariance, accuracy and precision can be illustrated by an 
analogy of measurement with rifle shooting, where the bull’s eye represents the (in 
practice unknown) true value x. A group of shots is precise when the shots lie close 
together. A group of shots is accurate when it has its mean in the bull’s eye. When 
during the shooting the alignment of rifle and target remains stable, even in a 
turbulent environment, this is a matter of invariance. 
 
To explore these three requirements and to show how different strategies deal with 
them, a more formal, though simplified, framework will be developed. It is assumed 
                                                 
2 ‘True value’ is an idealized concept and is by nature indeterminate. 
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that x is not directly measurable. In general, the value of x is inferred from a set of 
available observations yi (i = 1, …, n), which inevitably involve noise εi: 
 
 yi = F(x) + εi. (1) 
 
This equation will be referred to as the observation equation. The term for this kind of 
measurement is ‘indirect measurement’. We have ‘derived measurement’ if y = F(x) is 
an empirical law. 
 
To clarify the requirements of invariance, accuracy and precision when control is 
possible and when it is not, it is useful to rewrite Eq. (1) as a relationship between the 
observations y, the target variable x, and background conditions B: 
 
 y = f(x, B) = f(x, 0) + ε. (2) 
 
In other words, it is assumed here that noise is (only) caused by disturbing 
background influences. The observed quantity y can only provide information about 
the system variable, x, when this variable x does influence the behavior of y. In 
general, however, it will be the case that not only x will influence y, but that there will 
be also many other influences, B, too. To express more explicitly how x and other 
possible factors (B) influence the behavior of the observed quantities, the relationship 
is transformed into the following equation: 
 
 Δy = Δf(x, B) = fxΔx + fBΔB (3) 
 
where fx and fB are functions of x, y, and B that denote how much y will change 
proportionally due to changes in x and B, respectively. 
 
To achieve reliable measurement results, the following problems have to be dealt with: 
 
Inside the laboratory 
Taking care that the observations are as informative as possible about the measurand, 
or in other words, are as accurate and precise as possible, we have to reduce the 
influences of the other background factors B. In a laboratory, where we can control 
the environment, this can be achieved by imposing ceteris paribus conditions: ΔB = 0. 
By noise reduction, both requirements of accuracy and precision are met 
simultaneously: 
 
 ΔyCP = fxΔx (4) 
 
fx is the element of Eq. (3) that expresses the relation between the observed quantity y 
and the measurand x. This element should be, as much as possible, an invariant 
function – that is, it has to remain stable or unchanged for, and to be independent of, 
two kinds of changes: variations over a wide range of the system variable, Δx, and 
variations over a wide range of background conditions, ΔB (Woodward 2000). 
 
In the laboratory, the stability and shape of fx can be investigated because of the 
possibility of creating a ceteris paribus environment and the possibility of controlling 
the measurand: 
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 CPx
yf
x
Δ= Δ  (5) 
 
If the ratio of the variation of yCP and the variation of x appears to be a stable function, 
the correlation y = F(x) is an invariant relationship (a law) of which the shape can be 
inferred and subsequently used for the measurements of x. This relation y = F(x) then 
has become the measurement equation, also called the measurement formula. 
 
Outside the laboratory 
Outside the laboratory, where observations are ‘passive’, the assessment of invariance 
is much more complicated. To discover invariant observation relations to be used for 
measurement, one has no ceteris paribus environments at one’s disposal, or at least 
they are very rare. One has, instead, to look out for ceteris neglectis environments. 
These are environments were disturbing influences are negligible, that is, where fBΔB 
≈ 0. If in these circumstances 
 
 CNx
yf
x
Δ= Δ , (6) 
 
the ratio between the variation of the passive observations yCN and the variation of x 
appears to be a stable function, the observation relationship could be used for 
measurement purposes. 
 
The problem, however, is that it is not possible to identify the reason for a disturbing 
background influence being negligible. We cannot distinguish, ‘identify’, whether its 
‘potential influence’ is very small, that is when fB ≈ 0, or whether the factual variation 
of this factor in the set of observations under consideration is too small, ΔB ≈ 0. In the 
first case, it is justified to ignore this background influence, but this is not true for the 
latter case. The variation of B is determined by other relationships within the 
environment. In some cases, a virtually dormant factor may become active because of 
changes in the environment elsewhere. Each found empirical relationship is a 
representation of a specific data set. So, for each data set it is not clear whether 
potential influences are truly negligible or only dormant. 
 
This problem, called the problem of passive observation (Haavelmo 1944), can be 
dealt with by the strategy of comprehensiveness and it works as follows (see Sutton 
2000): when a relationship appears to be inaccurate, this is an indication that a non-
negligible potential background factor has been omitted in the model. As long as the 
resulting relationship is inaccurate, potential relevant factors should be added to the 
model. The expectation is such that this strategy will result in the fulfillment of two 
requirements: 
(1) the resulting model captures a complete list of factors that exert large and 
systematic influences; 
(2) all remaining influences can be treated as a sufficiently small noise component. 
 
The problem of passive observations is solved by accumulation of data sets: the 
expectation is that we converge bit by bit to a closer approximation of the complete 
model, as all the most important background factors reveal their influence. In other 
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words, the strategy aims at modeling not only the measurand but also by modeling its 
relevant environment as complete as possible. 
 
As a result, outside the laboratory, where we cannot control the environment, 
accuracy and precision have to be dealt with by using models as ‘virtual laboratories’, 
representing ceteris neglectis measuring system, in which reliability is not 
materialized (as in a laboratory) but achieved by setting the parameters carefully 
(Morgan 2003). To measure x, a model, denoted by M, has to be specified, for which 
the observations yi function as input and xˆ , the estimation of x, functions as output: 
 
 ˆ [ ; ]ix M y α=  (7) 
 
where α denotes the parameters of the model. Substitution of the observation equation 
(1) into model M (Eq. 5) shows what should be modeled (assuming that M is a linear 
operator): 
 
 ˆ [ ( ) ; ] [ ; ] [ ; ]x Bx M F x M x Mε α α= + = + ε α  (8) 
 
A necessary condition for xˆ to be a measurement of x is that model M must be a 
representation of the observation equation (1), in the sense that it must specify how 
the observations are related to the measurand. Therefore we first need a representation 
of the measurand, Mx. This specification should be completed with a specification of 
the error term, that is, a representation of the environment of the measurand, MB. As a 
result, outside the laboratory, accuracy and precision has to be dealt with in two 
different ways. To see this, we split the measurement error εˆ in two parts: 
 
 ˆ ˆ [ ; ] ( [ ; ] )B xx x M M x xε ε α α= − = + −  (9) 
 
To explore how this measurement error is dealt with, it may be helpful to compare 
this with the ‘mean-squared error’ of an estimator as defined in statistics: 
 
  (10) 2 2ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ[ ] [( ) ] ( )E E x x Varx Ex xε = − = + − 2
2−
 
The first term of the right-hand side of Eq. (10) is a measure of precision and the 
second term is called the bias of the estimator. If we expand Eq. (10) further, we have: 
 
  (11) 2ˆ[ ] ( [ ; ]) ( [ ; ] )B xE Var M M x xε ε α α= +
 
Comparing expression (9) with expression (11), one can see that the error term 
MB[ε; α] is reduced, as much as possible, by reducing the spread of errors, that is by 
aiming at precision. The second error term (Mx[x; α] – x) is reduced by finding an as 
accurate as possible representation of x. 
 
To obtain a reliable measurement result with an immaterial mathematical model, the 
model’s parameters have to be adjusted in such a way that both precision and 
accuracy are maximized. So, tuning, that is separating signal x and noise εˆ , is done by 
adjusting the parameter values α. The parameters should be adjusted such that 
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simultaneously MB[ε; α] and (Mx[x; α] – x) are reduced. In some fields this is called 
‘filtering’, in actuary ‘graduation’. 
 
Modeling and tuning in this way, however, does not yet solve the problem of 
invariance. To see what this problem entails outside the laboratory, we will first have 
to go back to the laboratory. According to Cartwright (1999), a law is invariant 
because it is the product of a nomological machine. A nomological machine is “a 
fixed (enough) arrangement of components, or factors, with stable (enough) capacities 
that in the right sort of stable (enough) environment will, with repeated operation, 
give rise to the kind of regular behaviour that we represent in our scientific laws” (p. 
50). So, this machine will only produce invariant relationships in a stable, that is, 
ceteris paribus environment (a laboratory). 
 
This idea of nomological machine shows that a measuring instrument must function 
as a nomological machine to fulfil its task. Measurement with an instrument is derived 
measurement, which uses (at least) one invariant relation (a law) between the 
instrument’s readings and the measurand. The instrument must be designed and 
constructed in such a way that the invariance of the measurement relation is 
guaranteed. 
 
Calibration 
As I have discussed above, nomological machines can also work successfully in a 
ceteris neglectis environment, so also outside the laboratory. A necessary requirement 
for a nomological machine to function as measuring instrument is that it should be 
stable (enough). For a ceteris paribus nomological machine the stability is guaranteed 
by its environment. In the case of a ceteris negelectis nomological machine the 
stability must be a feature of the machine itself. The problem, however, is to find 
ceteris neglectis nomological machines that are stable. These are the natural systems 
that can be used as a (natural) measurement system, on the condition that they are 
stable. The evaluation of whether a natural nomological machine is stable, that is the 
issue of invariance, can only be done at the level of the numerical representation 
(model) of this natural machine. The modelling strategy of comprehensiveness does 
not necessarily lead to the identification of a representation of an invariant machine. 
One cannot definitely decide whether one has such a machine even when one thinks 
to have found one. Any so far neglected potential factor can appear suddenly to be 
active and to influence the measurement’s accuracy negatively. 
 
In many field sciences, the solution to this problem is calibration. Calibration is the 
establishment of the relationship between values indicated by a measuring instrument 
and the corresponding values realized by standards. In the laboratory, a standard is an 
instrument or a constructed signal chosen as reference: under specific determined 
conditions it performs in a specific determinate way. Because one can control the 
conditions in a laboratory, calibration there is only a technical problem. Outside the 
laboratory, the idea of a standard is that it is often based upon naturally occurring 
phenomena when these possess the required degree of stability. A standard, in this 
context, is a representation of the stable properties of a phenomenon – stable facts. So, 
to apply the calibration strategy outside the laboratory, one needs stable facts as a 
reference. In natural science, obvious candidates are the universal constants, if 
available for the relevant phenomenon (the list of universal physical constants is 
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however small). In other fields, calibration is achieved by the involvement of (other) 
models to define or reveal standards or stable facts. 
 
In experimental science, calibration is one of the epistemological strategies used to 
distinguish between a valid observation and an artefact created by the instrument 
(Franklin 1997). Franklin (1997, 31) defines calibration as “the use of a surrogate 
signal to standardize an instrument. If an apparatus reproduces known phenomena, 
then we legitimately strengthen our belief that the apparatus is working properly and 
that the experimental results reproduced with that apparatus are reliable”. This kind of 
calibration is to establish the relationship between the values of quantities indicated 
by the instrument in one specific dimension and the corresponding standard values in 
the same dimension, to acquire reliability of the values indicated by the instrument in 
other dimensions. But one should be warned, this kind of calibration does not 
guarantee a correct result; though its successful performance does argue for the 
validity of the result. 
 
Franklin defines calibration in relation to instruments. But his definition can also be 
applied to the calibration of models. In the above framework this entails the following 
steps. A ‘surrogate’ input signal y0 is supposed to (re)produce output signal x0. These 
input and output data are used to calibrate the model, that is, to set the parameters α 
such that: 
 
 0[ ; ] 0M y xα =  (12) 
 
These parameters are denoted by α0. 
 
A result of this calibration strategy is that invariance has become an external feature 
of the model, instead of an internal feature that one or more of the empirical relations 
the model represents should be invariant. For a specific input it should always have a 
specific output referring to a stable fact about the measurand. 
 
What we have seen above is that the assessment of models as measuring instruments 
outside the laboratory is not based on the evaluation of a homomorphic 
correspondence between the empirical relational structure and the numerical relational 
structure. The assessment of these models is more like what is called validation in 
systems engineering. Validity of a model is seen as ‘usefulness with respect to some 
purpose’. Barlas (1996) notes that for an exploration of the notion validation it is 
crucial to make a distinction between white-box models and black-box models. In 
black-box models, what only matters is the output behavior of the model. The model 
is assessed to be valid if its output matches the ‘real’ output within some specified 
range of accuracy, without any questioning of the validity of the individual 
relationships that exists in the model. White-box models, on the contrary, are 
statements as to how real systems actually operate in some aspects. Generating an 
accurate output behavior is not sufficient for model validity; the validity of the 
internal structure of the model is crucial too. A white-box model must not only 
reproduce the behavior of a real system, but also explain how the behavior is 
generated. 
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Barlas (1996) discusses three stages of model validation: direct structural tests, 
structure-oriented behavior tests and behavior pattern tests. For white models, all three 
stages are equally important, for black box models only the last stage matters. 
 
Direct structure tests assess the validity of the model structure, by direct comparisons 
with knowledge about the real system structure. This involves taking each relation 
individually and comparing it with available knowledge about the real system. Barlas 
emphasizes that for these kinds of tests no simulation is involved. The second 
category, the structure-oriented behavior tests, assesses the validity of the structure 
indirectly, by applying certain behavior tests on model-generated behavior patterns. 
These tests involve simulations, and can be applied to the entire model, as well as to 
isolated sub-models of it. Barlas emphasizes the special importance of structure-
oriented behavior tests: these are strong behavior tests that can provide information on 
potential structure flaws. The information, however, provided by these tests does not 
give any direct access to the structure, in contrast to the direct structure tests. 
 
The most interesting structure-oriented behavior test that Barlas lists is the Turing test. 
This test was originally described by Turing (1950) as an ‘imitation game’ to 
investigate the question “Can machines think?” Today, a Turing test is generally 
described as follows: Reports based on output of the quantitative model and on 
measurements of the real system are presented to a team of experts. When they are not 
able to distinguish between the model output and the system output, the model is said 
to be valid. 
 
The enormous advantage of Turing’s approach to artificial intelligence is that it freed 
scientists from building replicas of the human mind to achieve machine thinking that 
meets the standard of human intelligence. In the same way, this kind of testing frees 
field scientists to build detailed, quantitatively accurate replicas of the actual 
nomological machine. Turing testing legitimizes to work with simpler models on the 
condition that it provides equally good answers as the more comprehensive models. 
 
The interesting feature of a Turing test is that validates a model along the same 
dimensions as the models has been calibrated, or in other words, it tests a model on 
whether it is calibrated properly. To have confidence that a computer is intelligent, it 
should give known answers to familiar questions. This induces trust that the machine 
will also give proper answers to question for which we do not have yet an answer and 
for which we actually had built the machine. Likewise, the measurements of the real 
target system that are used by the experts to assess a model are usually not the large 
sets of available data on this system, but a smaller set of stable facts well-known to 
the experts. 
 
Gray-box models 
Though Barlas emphasizes that structure-oriented behavior tests are designed to 
evaluate the validity of the model structure, his usage of the notion of structure for 
this category of tests needs some further qualification. The way in which he describes 
and discusses these tests shows that his notion of structure is not limited to accurate 
descriptions of the individual relations of the target systems; it also includes other 
kinds of arrangements, namely the assemblages of subsystems. 
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To trust the results of a simulation for measurement purposes, the models that are run 
should pass the Turing test but need not to be accurate representations of the relevant 
economic systems. To picture the architecture of these models passing the structure-
oriented behavior tests and behavior pattern tests, let us first label them as gray-box 
models – in line with the labeling of the other two types of models. 
 
In addition to the fact that structure-oriented behavior test legitimize simpler models 
of the nomological machines than the white-box models, they also provide heuristics 
of how to simplify these too complex models, namely by partitioning. 
 
Let us therefore recapitulate why calibration is an appropriate strategy for determining 
the model’s parameter set α. Therefore, I will use Woodward’s (1989) distinction 
between data and phenomena. According to Woodward, phenomena are relatively 
stable and general features of the world and therefore suited as objects of explanation. 
Data, that is, the observations playing the role of evidence for claims about 
phenomena, on the other hand, involve observational mistakes, are idiosyncratic, and 
reflect the operation of many different causal factors (see Eqs. (1)-(3)). Phenomena 
are more ‘widespread’ and less idiosyncratic, less closely tied to the details of a 
particular nomological machine. Because of the idiosyncrasy of the observations they 
are not appropriate to determine invariance. Facts about phenomena, however, do 
have the required non-idiosyncratic stability, and are therefore particularly apt to 
calibrate a measuring instrument outside the laboratory. Calibration does not take all 
observations into account but only picks out those stable facts the instrument should 
reproduce. 
 
Models are not calibrated on the level of the structural relations, in particular when 
these models are too comprehensive and detailed. For these kinds models it is not 
clear how the reproduction of stable facts relates back to individual structural relations, 
it may even be not possible to do so. In other words, in complex models it may not be 
possible to relate specific output characteristics to specific individual relations. Output 
characteristics are more the result of the interplay of these relations. It therefore more 
appropriate to locate the submodel which is responsible for specific behavior 
characteristics than to try to find an individual relation. 
 
The basis of this modeling strategy to deal with complexity is von Neumann’s (1963) 
General and Logical Theory of Automata. According to von Neumann, the problem of 
complexity consists of two parts. The first part is partitioning into elements: 
 
The natural systems are of enormous complexity, and it is clearly necessary to 
subdivide the problem that they represent into several parts. One method of 
subdivision, which is particularly significant in the present context, is this: The 
[natural systems] can be viewed as made up of parts which to a certain extent 
are independent, elementary units. (von Neumann 1963, 289). 
 
The second part consists of understanding how these elements are organized into a 
whole, and how the functioning of the whole is expressed in terms of these elements. 
The first part of the problem could be removed by the “process of axiomatization”: 
 
The Axiomatic Procedure. Axiomatizing the behavior of the elements means 
this; we assume that the elements have certain well-defined, outside, 
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functional characteristics; that is, they are to be treated as ‘black boxes”. They 
are viewed as automatisms, the inner structure of which need not be disclosed, 
but which are assumed to react to certain unambiguously defined stimuli, by 
certain unambiguously defined responses. (von Neumann 1963, 289) 
 
The general approach is of partitioning into elementary units, which can be treated as 
black boxes that are calibrated. It is remarkable that these elements are labeled as 
‘axioms’, indicating that they have some fundamental status. 
 
In current systems engineering, this calibrated black box is called a module: a self-
contained component with a standard interface to other components within a system 
(White 1999, 475). The great advantage of modular design is that it simplifies final 
assembly because there are fewer modules than subcomponents and because standard 
interfaces typically are designed for ease of fit (“plug and play”). Each module can be 
tested prior to assembly. Different measuring systems can be realized by different 
combinations of standard components. While each module has to be calibrated 
individually, the overall test for an assemblage of these modules is a kind of Turing 
test. 
 
As a result, a gray-box model is a specific assemblage of calibrated black-box models 
such that it functions as an instrument to measure a specific property of a 
phenomenon, and which is validated by a kind of Turing test. 
 
Conclusions 
The Representational Theory of Measurement conceives measurement as establishing 
homomorphisms from empirical relational structures into numerical relation structures, 
called models. This theory is rooted in the work of James Clark Maxwell, in particular 
his ideas about the use of analogies; “that partial similarity between the laws of one 
science and those of another which makes each of them illustrate the other” (Maxwell 
1965: 156). In other words, to the extent that two physical systems obey laws with the 
same mathematical form, the behaviour of one system can be understood by studying 
the behaviour of the other, better known. Moreover, this can be done without 
formulating any hypothesis about the real nature of the system under investigation. 
 
Heinrich Hertz recognized the value of the concept of formal analogy in trying to 
understand the essential features of the natural world. For Hertz, representations of 
phenomena, models, could only be understood in the sense of Maxwell’s analogies. 
“In order to determine beforehand the course of the natural motion of a material 
system, it is sufficient to have a model of that system. The model may be much 
simpler than the system whose motion it represents” (p. 176), but the model was only 
to be considered as a representation of a system under investigation if the 
consequences of (that is, the inferences from) a representation of that system are the 
representation of the consequences of that system. This requirement, however, would 
allow for many different models meeting this requirement. Hertz, therefore, 
formulated three additional requirements: First, a representation should be ‘(logically) 
permissible’, that is, it should not contradict the principles of logic. Second, 
permissible representations should be ‘correct’, that is, the relations of the 
representation must not contradict the system relations. Third, of two correct and 
permissible representations of the same system, one should choose the most 
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‘appropriate’. A representation is more appropriate when it is more distinct, that, 
when it contains more of the essential relations of the system; and when it is simpler, 
that is, when it contains a smaller number of superfluous or empty relations. Hertz 
explicitly noted that empty relations cannot be altogether avoided: “They enter into 
the images because they are simply images, - images produced by our mind and 
necessarily affected by the characteristics of its mode of portrayal” (Hertz 1956: 2). 
 
In short, the three requirements that a representation of a system should fulfill are: (1) 
logical consistency; (2) ‘correctness’, that there is correspondence between the 
relations of the representation and those of the system; (3) ‘appropriateness’, that it 
contains the essential characteristics of the system as simply as possible. Hertz 
considered the last requirement as most problematic to meet: 
 
We cannot decide without ambiguity whether an image is appropriate or not; 
as to this differences of opinion may arise. One image may be more suitable 
for one purpose, another for another; only be gradually testing many images 
can we finally succeed in obtaining the most appropriate. (Hertz 1956: 3) 
 
These requirements can be used to compare and characterize measurement strategies 
in- and outside the laboratory. Models used for measurement purposes inside the 
laboratory satisfy the correctness requirement and so are white-box models. To 
achieve accurate measurements outside the laboratory one needs to take account of 
the environment. This has two problematic consequences: a white-box modeling 
strategy, reflecting the complexity of the environment due to its correctness 
requirement, will readily lead to immensely large models. These models are 
representations of nomological machines outside the laboratory. But outside the 
laboratory there is no guarantee that the machine remains stable, which means that 
representations of it may not be accurate anymore for a new set of observations, with 
the subsequent consequence that its measurement results then would not be accurate. 
To arrange invariance, the models should be calibrated, that is, bringing them into 
accordance with stable facts about the measurand. A model strategy that allows for 
simplification such that it still remains accurate is gray-box modeling. This kind of 
model satisfies the appropriateness requirement, but drops the correctness requirement. 
 
Models for measurements outside the laboratory are not homomorphic mappings, but 
simulacra validated by a kind of Turing test. 
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